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Abstract
This article compares the conditions surrounding the crea-
tion of Canada’s former Indochinese Designated Class and 
the contemporary group processing program. Under this 
program the UNHCR identifies and refers entire group-
ings of refugees for resettlement in Canada. The article 
also briefly touches on the selection of Tibetan refugees by 
Canadian officials in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The 
Designated Class framework streamlined eligibility for 
resettlement and allowed government officials to respond 
to persons not covered by the narrower definition of refugee 
under the Convention. In a similar fashion, contemporary 
group processing aims to make resettlement processing effi-
cient by skipping refugee status determinations and using 
group profiles. The aftermath of the Indochinese resettle-
ment programs and the tightening of eligibility under the 
Indochinese Designated Class have shaped the creation of 
group processing. Concerns over “pull factors,” economic 
migration, and fraud, along with the securitization of 
migration, have led to a preference for homogenous and 
self-contained groupings of refugees. The article traces the 
Canadian government’s preoccupation with visualizing 
and drawing boundaries around groupings of refugees. 
While both group processing and the former Indochinese 
Designated Class aim to make resettlement processing effi-
cient, this objective plays a more prominent role under the 
former, intersecting with security practices in unique ways 
and informing the selection of groupings of refugees.
Résumé
Cet article entreprend une comparaison des conditions 
influant sur la création de l’ancienne Catégorie désignée 
d’Indochinois du gouvernement canadien avec celles qui 
ont contribué au programme contemporain de traite-
ment groupé de cas des réfugiés. Sous les auspices de ce 
programme, le HCR identifie et désigne des groupements 
entiers de réfugiés pour la réinstallation au Canada. L’ar-
ticle évoque également de façon brève le sélectionnement 
des réfugiés tibétains par des fonctionnaires canadiens 
durant la fin des années 60 et le début des années 70. Le 
cadre des Catégories désignées avait simplifié le processus 
d’admissibilité pour la réinstallation et permis aux fonc-
tionnaires du gouvernement de s’adresser aux personnes 
qui n’étaient pas couvertes par la définition plus étroite 
du statut de réfugié sous la Convention. De manière 
semblable, le traitement groupé contemporain de cas de 
réfugiés a pour objectif de rendre efficace le traitement des 
demandes de réinstallation en sautant l’étape de détermi-
nation de statut de réfugié et en se servant des profils grou-
pés. L’article propose que les conséquences des programmes 
de réinstallation visant les Indochinois, ainsi que le renfor-
cement des critères d’admissibilité dans le contexte de la 
Catégorie désignée d’Indochinois, ont influencé la création 
du traitement groupé de cas de réfugiés. Les préoccupations 
vis-à-vis des « facteurs d’attraction » pour les migrants, la 
migration économique, et la fraude, ainsi que la sécurisa-
tion de la migration, ont contribué à une préférence pour 
des groupements homogènes et bien délimités de réfugiés. 
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L’article décrit la préoccupation du gouvernement cana-
dien en matière de visualisation et de délimitation de grou-
pements de réfugiés. Bien que le traitement groupé ainsi 
que l’ancienne Catégorie désignée d’Indochinois partagent 
le même objectif de rendre le traitement de la réinstalla-
tion plus efficace, cet objectif joue un rôle plus important 
dans le cas du premier, se croisant avec des pratiques de 
sécurisation d’une façon inédite et influant sur la sélection 
de groupements de réfugiés.
Introduction 
Historically, states have grouped overseas refugees for resettlement, whether along the lines of nation-ality, ethnicity, race, labour skills, vulnerability, 
or political ideology.1 Depending on the context, some-
times this grouping is made explicit, whereas in others it 
is implicit in how the state responds to refugee movements, 
carving out groupings of refugees. This article focuses on 
those moments when the Canadian government has either 
explicitly developed frameworks for grouping refugees 
for resettlement or has reflected on this process. It charts 
changes in this process, from an emphasis on settlement 
potential with the Tibetans, to a desire to streamline eligi-
bility under the Indochinese Designated Class, and finally 
to contemporary obsessions over fraud, security, and the 
boundaries of groupings of refugees under group process-
ing. The initially open-ended designation of eligibility for 
the Indochinese is contrasted to the Canadian govern-
ment’s current preference for much tighter definitions of 
group membership under group processing. Concerns over 
“pull factors” and economic migration towards the end of 
the Indochinese resettlement program as well as UNHCR 
reforms in the late 1990s and early 2000s played an impor-
tant role in shaping the development of group processing in 
2003. In addition, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
have increased the security concerns of resettlement states. 
In response, the UNHCR has strengthened registration and 
identification practices aimed at dealing with fraud. While 
both the former Indochinese Designated Class and group 
processing aim to make resettlement processing efficient, 
under the latter this objective plays a central role as the state 
prefers self-contained and homogenous groupings of refu-
gees that are perceived as easy to process and not a threat to 
the Canadian population. I argue that contemporary preoc-
cupations with boundaries, visibility, homogeneity, and effi-
ciency under group processing provide the Canadian state 
with new variables of consideration in determining which 
grouping of refugees is the right fit for Canada.
The article draws on a mixture of archival research and 
interviews with key individuals familiar with Canada’s 
group processing. While archival research provides useful 
insights into the development of the Indochinese Desig-
nated Class, the Tibetan resettlement program, and official 
group resettlement procedures, it reveals less about how 
group processing decisions are made. For this reason, 11 
interviews were conducted with officials from Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada (CIC),2 the Canadian Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT),3 Canadian Border Services 
Agency (CBSA), the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and the Canadian Council for Refugees 
(CCR). While the empirical focus of the article is on the his-
torical and contemporary Canadian resettlement program, 
it also draws on the UNHCR’s group resettlement methodol-
ogy. Canada played a critical role in shaping the develop-
ment of this method as well as the revitalization of reset-
tlement within the UNHCR in the early 2000s. Additionally, 
the interviewing of UNHCR officials shed light on Canada’s 
group processing program and the multilateral character 
of both the Bhutanese and Karen Burmese resettlement 
initiatives. 
The article begins by briefly examining Canada’s selection 
of Tibetan refugees in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It con-
siders the UNHCR’s and Dalai Lama’s initial request to settle 
the Tibetans as a self-contained grouping, and the Canadian 
government’s reluctance to do so. Despite this reluctance, 
concerns over the ability of the Tibetans to successfully set-
tle in Canada shaped the government’s assessment of them. 
Implicitly, it treated them as a grouping. The article then 
turns its attention to the initially positive response by West-
ern countries to the plight of the Indochinese and the subse-
quent use of a loose definition of eligibility under Canada’s 
Designated Classes to resettle them. I highlight how this 
regulatory framework aimed to work outside the Refugee 
Convention and streamline the determination of eligibility. 
The increasing skepticism towards the Indochinese resettle-
ment programs in the buildup to the signing of the Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (CPA) in 1989 cast doubt on the open-
ended definition of eligibility under the Designated Class. 
The perception of economic migrants and “pull factors” led 
to individual screening mechanisms to determine refugee 
status. The signing of the CPA coincided with the end of the 
Cold War, removing an important geopolitical motivation 
behind largescale resettlement to Western countries. Dur-
ing the 1990s there was an emphasis on return, as resettle-
ment became the least-preferred durable solution. Despite 
this move away from resettlement, the UNHCR in the latter 
part of the decade began to reform its resettlement opera-
tions. By the early 2000s, resettlement states such as Canada 
began pushing the UNHCR to increase referrals. The crea-
tion of the group processing program in 2003 took place in a 
context where resettlement is officially based on protection 
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needs and is targeted towards protracted refugee situations. 
This focus, however, is matched by state preoccupations with 
fraud and security risks. Under group processing, there is 
an emphasis in clearly visualizing and identifying homog-
enous and self-contained groupings of refugees. To demon-
strate this, I draw on the program’s pilot project in 2003 that 
selected groupings of Somali Madiban and Sudanese from 
the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. The article also con-
siders the selection of the Bhutanese and the exclusion of 
Burundians, Rwandans, and Chechens from the program. 
I conclude by reflecting on the similarities and differences 
between group processing and the former Indochinese 
Designated Class. While earlier versions of the Indochinese 
Designated Class and contemporary group processing both 
aim to make resettlement processing efficient and place less 
emphasis on ensuring refugee status under the Convention, 
bureaucratic objectives are more pronounced under the 
latter, intersecting with security concerns in unique ways 
and informing the selection of groupings of refugees for 
resettlement. 
Tibetan Resettlement 
Following the annexation of Tibet by China in the 1950s, 
many Tibetans fled to India.4 Shortly afterward the Dalai 
Lama asked both Canada and Switzerland to accept Tibetan 
refugees. While Switzerland agreed, Canada declined. The 
former high commissioner to India, James George, noted 
that Immigration officials had concerns over the purport-
edly nomadic nature of the Tibetans, arguing that there was 
no immigration category for them.5 George would become 
a key figure in Canada’s eventual acceptance of the Tibetans, 
convincing former prime minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau to 
influence immigration officials to be more open to their 
resettlement.6 In 1966 the UNHCR attempted to persuade 
Canadian officials to settle the Tibetans as a “group,” the 
hope being that this would help meet their spiritual and 
cultural needs.7 A year later an interdepartmental commit-
tee was formed to consider the plight of Tibetan refugees. 
While the committee ruled out the idea of group settlement 
as contrary to immigration policy, the government agreed 
to accept the Tibetans on an individual or family basis.8
The initial apprehension of officials over nomads and 
the concept of group settlement reflected concerns at the 
time with the settlement potential of refugees. The decision 
against group settlement was based on the perception that 
it “would hinder the permanent integration of the Tibetans 
into the life of the country.”9 A report in 1975 by the Depart-
ment of Manpower and Immigration that reviewed the 
Canadian resettlement program for the Tibetans highlights 
how immigration officials preferred refugees from towns (or 
settled regions of Tibetans) with some form of secondary 
education. Officials also felt that younger married couples 
with small families and single workers would be easier to 
integrate. In contrast, there was a belief that older refugees 
and those from unsettled rural areas would have trouble 
finding employment, be difficult to train or retrain, and slow 
to learn one of Canada’s official languages.10 After a review 
of the Swiss experience with Tibetans, the interdepartmen-
tal committee in the late 1960s concluded, “Amongst the 
nomads the process of adaptation has been much more dif-
ficult. The nomads cling to the communal households that 
were set up to receive them. They are more dependent on 
official help and experience greater insecurity. Moreover 
they have a tendency to isolate themselves from Tibetans 
from other walks of life.”11 Not surprisingly, Canadian offi-
cials selected only two nomads from Tibet.12 
While the government refused to formally recognize the 
concept of group settlement with the Tibetans, it implicitly 
treated them as a grouping, assessing their education, skills 
levels, and ability to adapt to Canadian life. Under much 
different circumstances, group processing calls for the 
selection of self-contained groupings of refugees. In part, 
there is now a belief that this facilitates the integration of 
refugees.13 More important, the desire for self-contained and 
finite groupings reflects important changes in the rationale 
of how states approach resettlement. Understanding these 
changes requires consideration of the lasting influence of 
the Indochinese refugee movement and the eventual reform 
of the Designated Classes. 
Big Circles: The Indochinese Refugee Movement 
and the Evolution of the Designated Classes 
The daily media images of the plight of the Indochinese 
refugees in the 1970s captured the general public’s attention 
in Western states. And while Cold War ideological and geo-
political considerations guided Canada’s positive response 
to the Indochinese,14 so did humanitarian considerations. 
The international community’s selection of over 350,000 
Vietnamese and Laotian refugees, as well as half a million 
Cambodians, formalized a system of first asylum in the 
region for permanent resettlement elsewhere, also known 
as “an open shore for an open door.”15 The Canadian gov-
ernment resettled the Indochinese under the newly created 
Designated Classes system, following the passing of the 1976 
Immigration Act. This simplified the question of eligibility 
for resettlement by skipping refugee status determinations 
based on the Convention and focusing instead on admis-
sibility.16 Commenting on the Indochinese Designated 
Class, Raphael Girard explains, “Given that none of the boat 
people in South East Asia were going to return to Vietnam 
and they could not stay any length of time in the countries 
of first asylum, the issue of the Convention status of the 
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individuals was not crucial to their need for resettlement. 
This greatly enhanced the efficiency of our selection activi-
ties in the field.”17 
An important objective of the Designated Class frame-
work was to allow the Canadian government to respond to 
individuals in need of protection beyond the rather nar-
row definition of a refugee in the Convention.18 Under the 
Convention, and the text of the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, a refugee is “a person who is outside 
his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or 
her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling 
to avail him- or herself of the protection of that country, or 
to return there, for fear of persecution.”19 
Tanya Basok and Alan Simmons explain that the Des-
ignated Classes framework “gave authority to the Gover-
nor-in-Council to designate a group of people who do not 
qualify for Convention refugee status but who are, never-
theless, threatened by political, social or religious upheav-
als.”20 Commenting on the framework, Michael C. Lanphier 
points to how determinations of eligibility for resettlement 
could be moulded to “fit the characteristics of the particular 
group of displaced or persecuted persons.”21 He goes on to 
say that “the existence of the definition of three different 
‘Designated Classes’: Indochinese, Latin American, and Self-
Exile (East European), each with differing specifications, 
indicates a distinctly innovative and flexible governmen-
tal approach in determining eligibility for selection under 
relaxed refugee admissibility criteria.”22 
It is important to note that this was not the first time 
that the Canadian government developed refugee policies 
outside the framework of the Refugee Convention. Gerald 
Dirks explains that one reason the Canadian government 
was initially hesitant to become a signatory to the Conven-
tion in 1951 was the fear that it would lose the ability to deport 
or exclude refugees on national security grounds. In par-
ticular, authorities were concerned about Soviet espionage 
and subversion.23 Cold War politics guided Canada’s selec-
tion of refugees during this period, an important example 
being its positive response to the plight of the Hungarians 
in 1956–7.24 In 1969 Canada ratified the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol. That same year it set up a special program 
for Ugandan Asians. Girard notes the selection of Ugandan 
Asians was not affected by Canada’s signing to the Conven-
tion, since, “while no one had any doubt that these victims 
of racial hatred were refugees, in fact most could not meet 
the Convention definition because they were still in their 
country of citizenship or usual residence.”25 Girard goes on 
to say that whether or not the Ugandan Asians were refu-
gees was academic, “since Idi Amin himself had defined the 
eligible group based on their ethnicity.”26 The statements 
highlight how the grouping of refugees can simultaneously 
be inclusive and exclusive. On the one hand, the Ugandan 
Asians were excluded for their imputed membership in an 
ethnic grouping. On the other hand, this made it easier for 
the Canadian state to determine eligibility for resettlement. 
During this same period, the Canadian government 
attempted to redirect the refugee program away from its 
focus on European refugees towards the selection of non-
Europeans. As part of this move the federal Cabinet pro-
posed the creation of an “oppressed minority policy,” which 
would allow the government to respond to groupings of 
refugees that were of interest to authorities but did not fall 
under the Refugee Convention definition, specifically the 
requirement to be outside one’s country of citizenship or 
habitual residence.27 For different reasons then, throughout 
the post–Second World War period, the Canadian govern-
ment has worked outside the formal framework of the Refu-
gee Convention in its response to refugee movements. The 
“Designated Classes” were a continuation of this practice.
The sheer size of the Indochinese crisis and the visible 
urgency of the situation played a role in adopting a relatively 
open-ended definition of eligibility under the Designated 
Class framework. Canada considered Vietnamese along 
with Laotians, Cambodians, and Hmong who fled their 
countries of origin after 30 April 1975 to be ipso facto refu-
gees.28 This amounts to a prima facie status that has histori-
cally been used in situations of large-scale displacement.29 
Under this designation, each member is regarded prima 
facie as a refugee in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
In fact, in 1984 some within the Immigration Department 
felt that the Indochinese Designated Class definition of eli-
gibility was too narrow and was preventing the inclusion 
of individuals who had received permission to temporarily 
remain in countries signatory to the Refugee Convention 
but intended to resettle to Canada.30 Officials aimed to 
loosen eligibility so as to include more Indochinese. 
The Circle Is Getting Too Big 
As the crisis in Southeast Asia wore on, resettlement states 
increasingly viewed the movement of Indochinese refugees 
as motivated more by economic considerations than a genu-
ine concern with safety.31 A position paper from the Indo-
chinese Consultative Group Meeting in Ottawa in April 
1988 in the lead up to signing of the Comprehensive Plan 
of Action (CPA) suggests that resettlement was “initially the 
most immediate and simplest response to relieving the bur-
den of first asylum countries. Now it is part of the problem 
identified with the continued outflow as many persons are 
seeking resettlement for economic or family reasons rather 
than in response to individual persecution. To maintain 
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first asylum commitment throughout the region, resettle-
ment must remain part of the international response but not 
to the exclusion of encouraging other activities designed to 
deter the outflow.”32
Those “other activities” were the introduction of regional 
refugee status determination mechanisms and the encour-
agement of what was at first voluntary but later on involun-
tary repatriation under the CPA signed in 1989. This ended 
the use of “blanket resettlement”33 and the prima facie des-
ignation.34 As Sten Bronee explains, “The establishment of a 
procedure for determining refugee status brought an end to 
automatic resettlement.”35 
The CPA worked by using specific cut-off dates. Late arriv-
als to countries of first asylum in Southeast Asia would be 
subjected to refugee status screening mechanisms while the 
“long-stayers” who had been present in these countries up 
to these cut-off dates would continue to be automatically 
eligible for resettlement. An important issue for Canadian 
officials was to bring the Indochinese Designated Classes 
in line with the CPA. There was recognition that the defini-
tion of eligibility under this system was inconsistent with 
the introduction of screening mechanisms under the CPA. 
At a preparatory meeting of the International Conference 
on Indochinese Refugees in Kuala Lumpur in March 1989, 
the Canadian High Commission noted that Canada has 
the weakest legislative basis for dealing with the issue of 
non-eligible individuals.36 At that same meeting, Vietnam 
proposed using the Organization of African Union (OAU) 
definition of a refugee for screening purposes; however, the 
Canadian High Commission noted that this definition “is 
as broad as our Designated Class Regulations and Canada 
should not support inclusion [of it].”37 A month later, a letter 
to the minister of employment and immigration from the 
associate deputy minister/vice-chairman explains to the 
minister that, in light of the CPA’s focus on Convention refu-
gees, the “designated class regulations will eventually have 
to be reviewed, since their continued use would be both 
next to impossible in practical terms, and contradictory to 
the spirit of the common approach developed through the 
ICIR process.”38
The Indochinese Designated Class regulations were even-
tually reformed so that eligibility was restricted to Vietnam-
ese and Laotian “long-stayers” and “screened-in” recent 
Vietnamese and Laotian arrivals found to be Convention 
refugees.39 However, all Cambodians (both long-stayers 
and recent arrivals) would continue to be eligible under 
the regulations.40 Part of the government’s communication 
strategy was to emphasize that “these changes will help us 
concentrate our efforts on the ‘long stayer’ population in 
refugee camps through Southeast Asia.”41 There was a belief 
by some officials that the plight of the “long-stayers” would 
likely receive “considerable attention from the media and 
from interested groups in Canada.”42
Tightening eligibility under the Designated Class 
included closing a possible loophole for Indochinese guest-
workers working in Eastern Europe. An internal govern-
ment memo explains that under the revised Designated 
Classes the wording may allow Vietnamese, Laotian, and 
Cambodian guest workers in Eastern Europe to apply for 
benefits. The document explains that “the guestworkers left 
their countries of origin legally in order to work abroad. 
There should be no impediment to their return to Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia. In order to prevent large numbers of 
guestworkers from qualifying under these Regulations it is 
imperative the changes be made as soon as possible.”43
The closing of this loophole contrasts with the decision in 
1984 that sought to expand eligibility to individuals seeking 
temporary protection in countries that were signatories to 
the Convention prior to resettling in Canada. Such was the 
nature of the Designated Classes, which could be reformed 
to meet changing circumstances and political preferences. 
While the CPA certainly did not end large-scale resettle-
ment, its introduction of screening mechanisms, measures 
to deter clandestine departures from countries of origin, and 
consideration of involuntary repatriation (the most conten-
tious aspect of the agreement)44 reflected officials’ belief that 
many of the remaining Indochinese were no longer genuine 
refugees in need of resettlement. Moreover, resettlement 
was increasingly viewed as a “pull factor” linked to overly 
broad (or loose) definitions of eligibility under systems 
such as Canada’s Designated Classes. This can be seen in 
the UNHCR’s reflection on the response to the Indochinese 
refugee crisis in its 2011 resettlement handbook: “After the 
CPA, the use of large-scale resettlement as a solution waned. 
In retrospect, the decision in 1979 to adopt blanket reset-
tlement was seen as a major ‘pull-factor’ causing very large 
numbers of people to leave Vietnam primarily for economic 
and social reasons, rather than to seek protection. Mean-
while, elsewhere in the world, refugees in desperate need of 
resettlement suffered from lack of available places.”45
At the same time, there was a feeling by some officials 
that since Canada was increasingly becoming a country 
of first asylum it would have to scale back its resettlement 
numbers. At the Indochinese Consultative Group Meeting 
in Ottawa in April 1988 this concern was linked to the asso-
ciated backlog of refugee claimants in Canada and calls to 
end open-ended resettlement commitments.46 
The CPA also coincided with the end of the Cold War. 
For most of this period states relied on what Alexander 
Aleinikoff calls the exilic approach in dealing with the issue 
of forced displacement. This approach emphasized third-
country resettlement over the return of refugees to their 
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country of origin. Both Aleinikoff and B. S. Chimni chart 
its decline as beginning in the mid-1970s and taking hold in 
the 1980s.47 For Chimni, the move away from resettlement 
towards an emphasis on first voluntary and then later forced 
repatriation reflected the interests of dominant states. From 
their perspective, the absence of labour shortages no longer 
warranted large-scale resettlement.48 In addition, the end 
of the Cold War removed the political value in resettling 
large numbers of refugees fleeing communist regimes.49 In 
explaining the emphasis on the right of return in the 1990s, 
Aleinikoff notes, “From a liberal, human rights approach, 
the fundamental wrong done to refugees was a denial of 
their right to live freely in their home countries. Further-
more, forced exile violated the internationally recognized 
right of citizens to return to their countries of origin. From 
this perspective, resettlement can never be the primary rem-
edy because it does not restore the right; rather, the ‘basic 
solution’ must solve the problem of the denial of freedoms 
attending exile, either by preventing the conditions that 
compel flight or remedying those conditions after flight.”50
Aleinikoff argues that, given the entrenched practices 
of non-intervention into the affairs of a sovereign state, it 
is unlikely that developed states would attempt to rectify 
the human rights situations in countries of origin. For this 
reason, he suggests that the exilic bias is being exchanged 
for “policies of containment—detention of asylum seekers, 
visa requirements, closing opportunities for resettlement, 
pushbacks, and return. These policies are grounded less 
in a desire to breach the walls of state sovereignty than an 
attempt to keep Third World refugee problems from incon-
veniencing the developed states.”51 
In a similar vein, Jennifer Hyndman points to “efforts to 
assist refugees closer to their homes in ‘regions of origin.’ 
This occurred first in the early 1990s through a policy of 
‘preventative protection’ and then in the 2000s through the 
externalization of asylum.”52
These external pressures influenced the UNHCR as reset-
tlement became the least-preferred durable solution in the 
1990s.53 The organization came to view it as a protection tool 
targeted towards individuals and families who had become 
vulnerable in their country of asylum and therefore needed 
resettlement.54 Within the UNHCR there was a perception 
by some that resettlement was motivated by geopolitical 
considerations, as opposed to a genuine concern for refugee 
protection.55 
Despite the pressures against resettlement during this 
period there was some movement within the UNHCR in the 
latter half of the 1990s to once again raise its profile as a 
viable durable solution. Kristin Bergtora Sandvik points to 
the development of a comprehensive resettlement handbook, 
beginning in 1997, that set clear standards for referring 
refugees for resettlement.56 The organization aimed to 
emphasize rationality and transparency in its resettlement 
process in a bid to strengthen its credibility and broaden 
the confidence of resettlement states, refugees, and other 
partners.57 Sandvik explains that the idea behind the 2004 
version of the handbook “was that by constructing a rigor-
ous procedure of individual selection, within the confines of 
asylum and host country quotas, only ‘deserving refugees’ 
truly in need of protection would be found eligible for reset-
tlement.”58 The reforms stemmed from a perception within 
the UNHCR that its previous approach to resettlement was 
unorganized, ad hoc, prone to fraud, and disconnected 
from a broader analysis of protection situations involv-
ing refugees.59 A serious corruption scandal in Nairobi in 
1999–2000 that involved UNHCR staff members in the sell-
ing of resettlement spaces also contributed to the reforms in 
which “integrity is now a major theme of UNHCR’s resettle-
ment program.”60
By the early 2000s there emerged a renewed belief in 
the usefulness of resettlement as a potential durable solu-
tion.61 It is reflected in the passing of the UNHCR Agenda for 
Protection (2003) and Convention Plus initiatives (2004),62 
which called for the expanded use of resettlement as a 
durable solution, particularly for groupings of refugees.63 
These broad initiatives led to the signing of the UNHCR Mul-
tilateral Framework of Understanding on Resettlement,64 
which emphasized multilateral resettlement efforts focused 
on “protracted refugee situations” and the “strategic use of 
resettlement.”65 Officially, the strategic use of resettlement 
attempts to create benefits that extend beyond the refugees 
being resettled, including strengthening the protection 
environment in the country of asylum, decongesting camps, 
and opening up other durable solutions such as local inte-
gration.66 The idea is to utilize resettlement in tandem with 
other durable solutions as part of a comprehensive approach 
to dealing with protracted refugee situations.
The Canadian government played an important role in 
these efforts during this period. Shauna Labman explains 
that “as co-chair of the resettlement strand of Convention 
Plus, Canada led the authorship of the MFU [Multilateral 
Framework of Understanding on Resettlement].”67 In June 
2003, at a forum that discussed resettlement, the Canadian 
delegation tabled a discussion paper titled “Resettlement 
and Convention Plus Initiatives.” According to Joanne Van 
Selm, this paper had been developed in the Working Group 
on Resettlement under Canadian chairmanship. This is a 
forum for the UNHCR and resettlement states to discuss pri-
orities and needs in the area of resettlement. A UNHCR official 
noted that during this period the Canadian government was 
a very active chair of the Working Group on Resettlement.68 
Based largely on the Canadian resettlement program, the 
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discussion paper suggested that resettlement “can be a timely 
and cost effective durable solution.”69 Van Selm explains that 
the paper called for “protection-based criteria that go beyond 
the 1951 Convention [that] would help to make resettlement a 
more flexible tool.”70 As noted earlier, there is a long history 
in Canada of developing policies that determine eligibility 
outside the Refugee Convention framework. The emphasis 
on protection-based criteria is reflected in the passing of 
the 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 
Canada, which signalled a move towards a more liberal and 
non-discriminatory refugee system. 
Part of the revitalization of resettlement during this 
period also stemmed from the fact that states approached 
the UNHCR about increasing the referrals of refugees for 
resettlement. The organization responded by revamping 
and strengthening its referral methodologies in a bid to pro-
actively identify all refugees in need of resettlement globally 
as opposed to field officers being selective about referrals.71 
As the discussion above demonstrates, the Canadian gov-
ernment played a central role in the early 2000s in renewing 
resettlement. However, the emphasis on vulnerability, flex-
ibility surrounding the Convention definition of a refugee, 
and responding to protracted situations is only part of the 
story. Equally important are heightened concerns by states 
over security and fraud. A UNHCR official recalls that, in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the organization was 
forced to respond to these concerns by reinforcing identity 
and registration practices.72 At the same time, while the 
passing of IRPA in 2002 emphasized refugee protection, as 
Anna Pratt notes, it also ushered in a whole range of inad-
missible classes based on forward-looking risk-management 
techniques.73 In a similar vein, anticipating the effects of 
the passing of IRPA, Casasola argued that while “ability to 
establish” is a decreasing problem with Canada’s resettle-
ment program, medical and security restrictions are likely 
to be the new obsessions.74 
The character of contemporary resettlement differs 
from earlier largescale programs such as the Indochinese. 
Despite efforts to revitalize it, lasting concerns over “pull 
factors,” combined with obsessions over fraud and security, 
have led to a much more limited and targeted role of reset-
tlement. In the context of the strategic use of resettlement, 
these changes resonate with Mariana Valverde and Michael 
S. Mopas’s concept of “targeted governance” and its associ-
ated reliance on risk-management techniques informed by 
a neoliberal rationality.75 This rationality is reflected in the 
drive in group processing to make resettlement processing 
efficient. In part, this is achieved by using shortened UNHCR 
resettlement registration forms (RRFs), skipping refugee 
status determinations (the acceptance of prima facie basis), 
and implementing group profiles. In this respect, group 
processing is similar to early versions of the Indochinese 
Designated Class, as both work outside the Convention and 
simplify the question of eligibility for resettlement. However, 
it differs from later versions of the Indochinese Designated 
Class in that it is less concerned with ensuring refugee status 
under the Convention than with developing clear criteria for 
membership in chosen groupings. Moreover, bureaucratic 
objectives intersect with security concerns and inform the 
selection of specific types of groupings of refugees viewed as 
ideal for efficient forms of overseas processing. 
The desire for finite and homogenous groupings of refu-
gees can be seen in the initial discussions among the IOM, 
UNHCR, and Canadian Immigration authorities during the 
group processing pilot project in 2003. The UNHCR had 
approached the Canadian government about resettling two 
groupings of refugees out of the Dadaab refugee complex 
in Kenya. The first was what was understood as a “distinct” 
group of Somali Madiban and the second was a group of 
Sudanese refugees. The UNHCR had determined that mem-
bers of each grouping had similar refugee claims. As a result, 
Canada was willing to use the prima facie designation for 
them.76 However, authorities insisted that the UNHCR have 
safeguards in the process in order to ensure there were no 
“imposters as part of the groups.”77 A CBSA official empha-
sized the importance of being able to establish identity and 
to confirm that individuals are genuinely members of the 
groupings. State officials worked with UNHCR and IOM staff 
to verify membership in the chosen groupings. The CBSA set 
up guidelines of the screening process, defined the chosen 
groupings (i.e. who’s included), and contracted the IOM to do 
the initial pre-screening. The same CBSA official describes 
the discussions that occurred between CIC and the IOM: 
“What we said to the IOM is, ‘We want you to work with the 
UNHCR, and what we want you to do is to define and encap-
sulate this group. And once you have done that, nobody can 
be added afterwards and nobody can leave the group, as 
long as they are content to be a part of that group.’”78 
Demonstrating the unease that Canadian officials 
sometimes have with group resettlement, the same official 
exclaimed, “It’s not just identifying the individuals. It’s 
identifying the individual within the context of the group. 
Refugees are no different than anyone else. If they can inject 
themselves into a group, they will do that, just because they 
are desperate enough to get out.”79 
While the IOM and UNHCR conduct numerous identifica-
tion and verification exercises under group processing, from 
the perspective of Canada’s security agencies, the organiza-
tion lacks the intelligence to back these assessments. The 
same CBSA official quoted above refers to the UNHCR’s 
screening practices as being based on “face value.” In con-
trast, the CBSA purportedly has significant intelligence on 
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terrorist organizations and groups.80 For this reason, Cana-
dian officials reverified the identities of the chosen Somali 
Madiban and Sudanese groupings and then compared them 
with the initial UNHCR list of members of both groups. This 
became the standard practice for Canada’s group-process-
ing program and was applied to both the Karen and Bhuta-
nese refugee groups. 
While the Bhutanese was a much larger grouping of 
refugees compared to the Somali Madiban and Sudanese, 
discussions in both the Core Group on the Bhutanese (CGB) 
and the more routine Working Group on Resettlement 
(WGR) led to the belief that this refugee population was suf-
ficiently encapsulated, given the particular location of the 
camps that house them in Nepal. This in turn minimized the 
potential for “pull factors” and the infiltration of what were 
perceived as unwanted elements into the camps. The same 
CBSA official remarked that because Nepal was not contigu-
ous with Bhutan, “it was a pretty encapsulated population, 
it was a big population, but it was essentially defined.”81 In 
addition, CBSA and CSIS assessments had determined that 
the Bhutanese were not a security risk to Canada. In fact, 
one official referred to them as a “clean population.”82
In contrast to these chosen groupings of refugees, some 
are deemed problematic and are therefore excluded from 
the program. From the perspective of some within the 
Canadian security establishment, the current situation 
in the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya is no longer ideal 
for group processing, for several reasons. First, there is 
a concern that this refugee population contains “threat-
ening” elements, specifically members of the listed ter-
rorist organization Al Shabaab. An immigration official 
explained, “Bottom line, we cannot claim that the entire 
Somali population is problem-free.”83 Second, according to 
this same official, the mixed nature of the refugee popula-
tion in Dadaab (some are fleeing famine as opposed to per-
secution under the Convention) makes the current Somali 
refugee population in Dadaab an unlikely candidate for 
Canada’s group processing.84 Similar concerns were found 
with Burundians and Rwandans, what one official referred 
to as the “genocide populations.” The same official explains, 
“If we had a really problematic population (and we have had 
problematic populations in Africa), it’s particularly people 
that were involved in genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. We 
can’t touch those populations. Those are very difficult, and 
as a group they are more problematic than they are worth 
our time to try and go in and screen out the good from the 
bad, because there was so many of them involved at various 
times with respect to genocide.”85 
Under group processing, heterogeneous groupings of 
refugees with “risky” elements are excluded, as the Cana-
dian government wishes to avoid separating “risky” from 
“at-risk” individuals. Such practices are viewed as running 
counter to the bureaucratic objectives of the program to 
streamline the overseas processing of groupings of refugees. 
Several officials used the expression “generate efficiencies” 
in describing this objective of group processing.86 
The drive for efficiency has led to attempts by officials 
to anticipate whether or not group processing candidates 
would require lengthy security assessments. A Canadian 
Immigration official’s remarks on CIC’s reliance on the CBSA 
for security screening under group processing demonstrate 
this concern: 
We only go to CBSA once we have figured that this is a population 
that we might be interested in, that we actually could have the 
capacity, the resources that we could get to them. We ask them, “Is 
there a real reason why we shouldn’t [chose them]? Do they have 
flags?” If they tell us that 30 per cent of that population you are 
going to have to send for an in-depth clearance process, much 
more scrutiny, where there is a CSIS interview, then obviously we 
are not going to get any savings there, no efficiencies to be gener-
ated. People would be sitting in limbo waiting for clearance.87
An example of this occurred when Canadian officials 
rejected Chechens for group processing. According to the 
same official, “As a general rule, we’ve told the UNHCR, 
‘Don’t bother referring us groups of Chechens.’ The number 
that have been engaged in other activities, it’s like every one 
of them would have to go through a thorough screening, the 
odd individual woman maybe. ‘But don’t come to us and say, 
“Would you take 500 Chechens?,” because we know that all 
500 we would have to really scrutinize.’”88
Rather than expend the resources necessary to sort the 
“risky” from the “at-risk,” the state avoids groupings of refu-
gees deemed potentially “risky.” Part of this process involves 
the examination of what the CBSA calls the “inadmissibility 
patterns” of refugee populations. A CBSA official explained 
that, on the basis of these examinations, the security agency 
would determine if refugee groups were good candidates 
for resettlement.89 This suggests that with group processing, 
security screening involves not only the comparison and 
contrasting of different groupings of refugees, but also the 
same grouping across different time periods. Risk-manage-
ment techniques take on spatial and temporal dimensions. 
The “inadmissibility patterns” of earlier asylum claimants 
and resettlement applications from a refugee population 
play a role in determining the viability of offering resettle-
ment to current refugees from the same population. The 
relation between the drive for efficiency and security prac-
tices under group processing has led to novel variables of 
consideration in determining the ideal grouping of refugees 
for resettlement. 
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A key document used in group resettlement schemes such 
as group processing is the UNHCR’s Group Profile and Pro-
posal Document (GPPD). As noted earlier, GPPDs, or group 
profiles, permit the use of either shortened Resettlement 
Registration Forms (RRFs) for chosen members of a grouping 
or, in the case of the United States Priority 290 referral, the 
direct transmission of basic bio data without RRFs.91 Among 
the things included in this profile are gender breakdown of 
the refugee population, ethnic, religious, occupational and 
social background, exclusion concerns, durable solutions 
analysis, quality of registration, need for resettlement, and 
possibilities for “pull factors.” The GPPD also considers how 
homogenous groupings of refugees are in common causes 
of flight, or narratives of persecution and the grouping’s 
distinctiveness relative to the wider refugee population in 
refugee camps.92 Commenting on the makeup of the GPPD, 
Martin explains, “The objective is to identify ‘finite groups’ 
that can become the focus of resettlement efforts. Such clar-
ity about the group’s dimensions is important, both to guard 
against fraud and to minimize any magnet effect generated 
by the resettlement activity. This theme was repeated to me 
many times during my interviews.”93 
Martin points to how the group methodology reflects 
how to overcome opposition to resettlement by some within 
the UNHCR ranks, on the basis of concerns over new “pull 
factors.”94 
These concerns are reflected in the statements of a UNHCR 
official who explained that resettlement countries like to 
draw a circle around the grouping in order to know who’s 
in it and who’s not.95 The same official said, “It’s like if you 
had perfect vision at the moment, you would know all the 
people that are in that group . . . To give you an example, one 
of the group definitions would be like Eritreans of Kunama 
ethnicity who are in the Shemelba camp who are registered 
between this date and that date, so in theory, even if you 
don’t have all those names right in front of you right then, 
it’s a finite group.”96
The notions of “perfect vision” and “drawing circles” 
capture the active role that states play in crafting homog-
enous and self-contained groupings of refugees. This is to be 
achieved through multiple verification and re-verification 
exercises and the proactive production and analysis of 
group profiles. The need for such clarity of group member-
ship differs from the earlier definitions of eligibility under 
the Indochinese Designated Class in which individual Viet-
namese, Cambodians, and Laotians were eligible for reset-
tlement to Canada if they could demonstrate that they left 
their respective countries of origin after 30 April 1975. 
As noted earlier, group processing was created in a 
context in which states and the UNHCR sought to revital-
ize resettlement. In part, this move was in response to 
increased concerns over protracted refugee situations, or 
what was known in the early 2000s as refugee warehous-
ing. Under the strategic use of resettlement, the selection of 
large groupings of refugees with similar protection needs 
is viewed as one solution in resolving these situations.97 At 
the same time, the desire for “perfect vision” and “drawing 
circles” attempts to capitalize on the immobility of refugees 
caught in prolonged displacement. The perceived distinc-
tion between the heterogeneous nature of refugees in urban 
centres, compared to the homogeneity and immobility of 
camp refugees, is captured by one UNHCR official: 
In a camp situation you have a group of people who are very 
homogenous, because they belong to the same ethnic group, they 
came out of the same protection situation .  .  . so you have .  .  . a 
population which is very homogenous, in terms of not only their 
profile, they are all the same country, same nationality, the same 
ethnic group, the same language, the same everything . . . unlike 
in an urban context where you have a mixed bag of cases [in] 
which you have a refugee from Iran, who escaped because of reli-
gious persecution, a refugee from another country who escaped 
because of political activities.98 
When there are limited resettlement spaces, the decision 
to focus group resettlement efforts only on refugee camps 
has serious consequences for the millions of refugees living 
in urban centres. Moreover, even within the space of refugee 
camps, the desire for “perfect vision” and “drawing circles” 
is confronted with fluid situations. Hyndman’s analysis of 
“ordering disorder” in Kenyan refugee camps points to the 
standardization efforts of the UNHCR that fail to account 
“for local historical contexts” and to refugees who resist 
technologies of knowing, such as headcounts.99
The preference of resettlement states for groupings of 
refugees with common narratives of flight and persecution 
has created tensions with the UNHCR’s system for deter-
mining resettlement need. States prefer to group refugees 
according to similar ethnicity, location, experiences of vio-
lence, or flight, while the UNHCR bases decisions on the need 
for resettlement in countries of first asylum.100 Given state 
concerns over security and fraud, as well as the UNHCR’s 
reliance on donors, it is difficult to envision the organiza-
tion challenging states on this matter. As the UNHCR has 
attempted to reassert the legitimacy of its resettlement 
operations, it has developed mechanisms to mitigate fraud 
and deal with potential “pull factors” in programs such as 
its group methodology. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the post–Second World War period the Cana-
dian government has developed different frameworks for 
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grouping refugees. In many cases these worked outside the 
formal definition of a refugee under the Convention. While 
the government refused group settlement with the Tibetans, 
it treated them as a grouping in other ways, separating those 
perceived as easy to integrate and those deemed difficult. 
A different set of priorities was behind the creation of the 
Designated Classes. With the Indochinese, the concern was 
to make resettlement more efficient by streamlining eligi-
bility and having the flexibility to work outside the narrow 
framework of the Refugee Convention. At the beginning 
of the Indochinese crisis, a mix of Cold War politics and 
humanitarian concerns supported a broad definition of eli-
gibility for resettlement. As the crisis wore on, however, and 
circumstances changed, the government sought to tighten 
this eligibility. 
The conditions surrounding the creation of group pro-
cessing differ and yet were influenced by the aftermath of 
the Indochinese resettlement programs. Similar to earlier 
versions of the Indochinese Designated Class, there is less 
concern with ensuring refugee status based on the Con-
vention; the state accepts the prima facie designation. This 
gives the Canadian government the flexibility to select 
groupings of refugees it desires, regardless of whether or 
not members of these groupings fit the narrow definition 
of a refugee under the Convention. However, concerns over 
fraud, security risks, and “pull factors” have led officials to 
obsess over clear criteria for membership in groupings of 
refugees selected for resettlement. The state is preoccupied 
with visualizing and drawing boundaries around groupings 
of refugees. Moreover, the emphasis on creating efficiencies 
is much more pronounced, compared to the former Indo-
chinese Designated Class. While the Canadian government 
reformed definitions of eligibility under later versions of 
Indochinese Designated Class in response to concerns over 
“pull factors” and economic migrants, under group pro-
cessing it avoids risky, fluid, and heterogeneous groupings 
of refugees. The relations between the neoliberal drive for 
efficiency, security practices, and the desire for homogeneity 
under group processing point to new variables of considera-
tion in the Canadian state’s assessment of the ideal grouping 
of refugees for resettlement. 
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